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INTRODUCTION 
The same month Caitlyn Jenner debuted herself to the world on the cover 
of Vanity Fair magazine, the Guardian published a profile about Michelle-Lael 
Norsworthy and her years-long struggle to get treatment for gender dysphoria 
while in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabili-
 
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2021, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Neva-
da, Las Vegas. Thank you to Whitney Jones, Notes Editor, for her early guidance on the di-
rection of this Note. Thank you to Erika Smolyar, Articles Editor, for her diligent work on 
improving my writing. To my faculty supervisor Professor Eve Hanan, whose thoughtful 
insight illuminated aspects of this topic I would have otherwise overlooked. To the staff of 
the Nevada Law Journal for its efforts in bringing this Note to publication. And finally, 
thank you to my wife, Caitlyn, my son, Ryan, and my daughter, Rose. I am perpetually hum-
bled by your boundless patience. 
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tations.1 There are thousands of transgender persons incarcerated in America.2 
For most, incarceration comes with taunts, threats, sexual violence, and isola-
tion.3 For many, this experience is compounded, as it was in Ms. Norsworthy’s 
case, by a refusal from correctional departments to provide adequate treatment 
for gender dysphoria.4 In many of these cases, the only recourse is civil litiga-
tion, where the individual must rely on a court to enforce the constitutional 
right to adequate medical treatment.5 
The American Psychiatric Association defines gender dysphoria as “a 
marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and as-
signed gender.”6 The condition is “associated with clinically significant distress 
or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”7 
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (“WPATH”) pro-
vides standards of care for the treatment of individuals diagnosed with gender 
dysphoria.8 The WPATH Standards of Care outline best practices related to, 
 
1  Ed Pilkington, ‘Prison Within Prison’: A Transgender Inmate’s Years-Long Battle for 
Treatment, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2015, 7:09 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/201 
5/jul/26/transgender-woman-inmate-prison-michelle-norsworthy [perma.cc/NPV8-T2E2]. 
2  The Justice Department’s latest estimate comes from 2014 and was 3,209. BUREAU OF 
JUST. STAT., SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12: 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112_st.pdf [per 
ma.cc/JFS2-9M98]. This Note uses the American Psychological Association’s definition of 
transgender: “[a]n umbrella term encompassing those whose gender identities or gender 
roles differ from those typically associated with the sex they were assigned at birth.” A Glos-
sary: Defining Transgender Terms, MONITOR ON PSYCH., Sept. 2018, at 32, https://www.apa. 
org/monitor/2018/09/ce-corner-glossary [perma.cc/2RTH-9FG4]. Despite a history of stig-
ma, to be transgender is not a mental health disorder or a medical condition. See Suyin 
Haynes, The World Health Organization Will Stop Classifying Transgender People as Hav-
ing a ‘Mental Disorder,’ TIME (May 28, 2019, 12:25 PM), https://time.com/5596845/world-
health-organization-transgender-identity/ [perma.cc/24Y9-LXCM]. Many transgender peo-
ple, however, suffer from gender dysphoria, a medical diagnosis for persons who experience 
serious emotional distress caused by the difference between the gender assigned to them at 
birth and the gender they know themselves to be. Frequently Asked Questions About 
Transgender People, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (July 9, 2016), 
https://transequality.org/issues/resources/frequently-asked-questions-about-transgender-peop 
le [perma.cc/2LF6-3C62]. The plaintiffs involved in the cases discussed in this Note suffer 
from gender dysphoria and requested treatment associated with that medical diagnosis. 
3  See, e.g., Editorial Board, Prisons and Jails Put Transgender Inmates at Risk, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/opinion/prisons-and-jails-put-transgen 
der-inmates-at-risk.html [perma.cc/T5ZW-QYX6] (describing the experience many 
transgender people have while incarcerated). 
4  See, e.g., Pilkington, supra note 1. 
5  See discussion infra Part II. 
6  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
452 (5th ed. 2013). 
7  Id. at 453. 
8  See generally ELI COLEMAN ET AL., WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, 
STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER 
NONCONFORMING PEOPLE (2012), https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7 
/Standards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf [perma.cc/J6MR-W6WR] 
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among others, mental health, hormone therapy, and sex reassignment surgery 
(“SRS”).9 The Standards of Care are based on “the best available science and 
expert professional consensus” and are widely accepted as the guidelines for 
treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria.10 
During the past three decades, incarcerated individuals suffering from gen-
der dysphoria have filed lawsuits seeking court orders requiring correctional 
departments to provide the individuals with SRS.11 These suits are generally 
brought as deliberate medical indifference claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.12 Three circuit courts of appeals have addressed these claims. De-
spite reaching opposite results for the respective plaintiffs involved, the First 
and Ninth Circuits both held that each case required an individualized inquiry 
into the specific facts of the plaintiffs’ cases.13 These decisions closely follow 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to deliberate medical indiffer-
ence claims.14 In an unusual decision, however, the Fifth Circuit held that pris-
ons could impose blanket bans on SRS entirely.15 This Note discusses the Gib-
son v. Collier decision in the context of other Eighth Amendment cases and 
brings attention to the potential questions the decision might raise for the Fifth 
Circuit moving forward. 
Part I of this Note outlines policies related to the housing and treatment of 
transgender persons as they differ by correctional department. Part II briefly 
summarizes the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and traces the de-
velopment of the deliberate medical indifference claim. Part III summarizes the 
three circuit court opinions addressing SRS for incarcerated individuals. Final-
ly, Part IV analyzes Gibson against Eighth Amendment precedent and calls at-
tention to questions raised by this unusual decision. 
 
[hereinafter WPATH]. 
9  Id. at 1. Many transgender people prefer the term “gender confirmation surgery” because 
“[a]s many trans folks have noted, surgery doesn’t change one’s gender—it changes the 
body in which one experiences that gender.” KC Clements, What to Expect from Gender 
Confirmation Surgery, HEALTHLINE (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health/tran 
sgender/gender-confirmation-surgery [perma.cc/9KEL-RJMS]. This Note uses “sex reas-
signment surgery” because that is the term used in both the current WPATH standards of 
care and in each case discussed in this Note. 
10  WPATH, supra note 8, at 1; see infra Section IV.B. 
11  See discussion infra Part III. This Note focuses only on cases in which the plaintiff seeks 
SRS and does not include cases where the plaintiff disputes the adequacy of mental health or 
hormonal treatments. 
12  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also discussion infra Part II. 
13  Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 794 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Edmo II”); see Kosilek v. 
Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Kosilek IV”). 
14  See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
15  Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 215–16 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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I. PRISON POLICIES RELATING TO TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS 
Prison policies relating to the treatment of persons with gender dysphoria 
vary widely. Some correctional departments provide detailed guidelines cover-
ing diagnosis, housing, property, and medical treatment, including the oppor-
tunity to be reviewed for SRS eligibility.16 Others provide guidelines for intake, 
housing, and treatment in the form of counseling or hormone therapy but re-
main silent as to whether SRS might be an option.17 Finally, some correctional 
departments provide a general plan for compliance with the Prison Rape Elimi-
nation Act (“PREA”), with no specific treatment guidelines for persons with 
gender dysphoria.18 While some states have undertaken to address the 
healthcare issues faced by transgender individuals behind bars, in a majority of 
states, the adequacy of the treatment these individuals receive creates concern.19 
 In 2017, Prison Policy Initiative undertook an evaluation of twenty-one 
states’ policies as related to PREA and the WPATH Standards of Care.20 The 
evaluation included findings that 81 percent of state policies failed to provide 
for psychotherapy, let alone pharmaceutical therapy or SRS for incarcerated 
persons with gender dysphoria.21 The findings further showed that 37 percent of 
transgender individuals who were receiving hormone therapy prior to incar-
ceration were denied hormones once inside, resulting in exposure to serious 
medical consequences.22 Prison Policy Initiative ultimately concluded that 
“[a]ll but one [state came] up short” in treating transgender individuals.23 
 
16  See, e.g., CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., 
CCHCS/DHCS CARE GUIDE: TRANSGENDER (2020), https://cchcs.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads 
/sites/60/CG/Transgender-CG.pdf [perma.cc/RQ2H-B3JZ]; CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE 
SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR 
GENDER AFFIRMING SURGERY 5 (2018), https://cchcs.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/60/CG 
/Guidelines-ReviewRequestsGender-Affirming-Surgery.pdf [perma.cc/XVG3-QPLY]. 
17  See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., OFFENDER HEALTH SERVICES: PRACTICES CONCERNING 
TRANSGENDER OFFENDERS, REG. NO. 700–14 (2019), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ULY1 
8Ojom9C4S9OKxEAKahBL0ZuAql7J/view [perma.cc/6KX2-9GQ6]. 
18  See, e.g., CORR. INST. DIV., TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., SAFE PRISONS/PREA PLAN (2019), 
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/cid/Safe_Prisons_PREA_Plan.pdf [perma.cc/V8AK-
AVWP]. 
19  See Elliot Oberholtzer, The Dismal State of Transgender Incarceration Policies, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/11/08/transgender 
/ [perma.cc/9CFJ-HY57]. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. Oberholtzer spotlights Delaware as having the “best policy for the treatment of 
transgender people in prison.” Id. Even still, Delaware’s “excellent policy” does not express-
ly provide for mastectomies, indicating, according to Oberholtzer, “an additional barrier to 
care for trans men: the faulty assumption, almost universal in these policies, that the only 
transgender individuals who end up incarcerated are trans women.” Id. Oberholtzer’s article 
was written prior to California’s new policy being implemented. See infra notes 39–52 and 
accompanying text. 
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 Every state except Utah has agreed to comply with PREA,24 and most have 
outlined a general compliance plan that at least touches on the classification 
and housing of transgender individuals.25 The Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice’s “Safe Prisons/PREA Plan,” for example, provides guidelines for de-
termining where a transgender individual will be housed on a case-by-case ba-
sis.26 The guidelines balance security concerns against the health and safety of 
the individual, including giving “serious consideration” to the individual’s 
views with respect to the individual’s own safety.27 The guidelines further per-
mit transgender persons to shower separately from other incarcerated persons 
and require staff to be trained in the methods of conducting pat-down searches 
in the “least intrusive manner possible.”28 While the department’s guidelines 
dictate that all individuals identified as transgender be referred to medical 
staff,29 they are silent as to the manner or scope of treatment an individual may 
receive. 
 Other states outline methods for treating transgender individuals but are si-
lent as to whether SRS would be an option.30 For example, the Colorado De-
partment of Corrections’ “Practices Concerning Transgender Offenders” Ad-
ministrative Regulation provides procedures for the intake, housing, and 
medical treatment specific to incarcerated persons with gender dysphoria.31 The 
procedures allow for the continuation (or commencement) of hormone therapy, 
along with access to psychiatric and mental health services, including individu-
al and group support therapy.32 The procedures are silent as to SRS, but do pro-
vide for a “Gender Dysphoria and Treatment Committee,” which proposes in-
dividualized treatment plans for transgender individuals.33 The procedures 
specifically note that treatment plans may include but are not limited to “real 
life experiences consistent with the prison environment, hormone therapy, and 
counseling.”34 As such, the procedures may be read to imply that SRS could be 
 
24  Utah has rejected to implement PREA’s standards since the bill’s passage in 2003, choos-
ing instead to forfeit approximately $140,000 in federal grant money each year. See Luke 
Ramseth, Utah One of Only Two States Not Complying with Federal Prison-Rape Guide-
lines, DOJ Says, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 15, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://archive.sltrib.com/arti 
cle.php?id=5284203&itype=CMSID [perma.cc/K5Q6-CYEK]. That article mentions Arkan-
sas as well; however, the state appears to have now implemented PREA. See ARK. DEP’T OF 
CORR., PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT (PREA), ADMIN. DIRECTIVE NO. 15–29 (2017), 
https://adc.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/AD_2015-29_PREA.pdf [perma.cc/9UMU-AC5D]. 
25  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
26  CORR. INST. DIV., TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., supra note 18, at 19. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 9, 34. 
29  Id. at 16. 
30  See COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 17. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. at 5. 
33  Id. at 1. 
34  Id. at 5. 
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granted in certain cases; however, there is no evidence that the department has 
ever granted SRS or denied it.35 
 Delaware, California, and Oklahoma lay out explicit policies and guide-
lines for SRS, should the treatment be medically necessary for a transgender 
individual behind bars.36 Delaware’s Department of Correction policy provides 
for SRS to be “considered on a case-by-case basis as a component of the indi-
vidualized treatment plan.”37 Oklahoma’s Department of Corrections policy al-
lows for SRS only in “extraordinary circumstances.”38 The California Depart-
ment of Corrections and Rehabilitations (“CDCR”) has the most permissive 
guidelines for the treatment of transgender individuals, permitting any request 
for SRS to be considered by three separate committees, provided the individual 
meets basic prerequisite criteria.39 All requests are ultimately reviewed by an 
SRS Review Committee comprised of two physicians from CDCR’s Medical 
Services, two physicians from CDCR’s Mental Health Program, and two psy-
chologists from CDCR’s Mental Health Program.40 The Committee considers a 
number of factors, including the continuously manifested desire to live as one’s 
preferred sex, the individual’s distress due to gender dysphoria,41 and whether 
the individual can be expected to adjust to confinement postoperatively.42 The 
 
35  The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ guidelines similarly mention “hormone or other necessary 
medical treatment,” while remaining silent as to SRS specifically. See FED. BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TRANSGENDER OFFENDER MANUAL 9 (rev. 2018), https://www. 
bop.gov/policy/progstat/5200-04-cn-1.pdf [perma.cc/B2KE-H6WT]. 
36  See DEL. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY E-14 TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER PERSONS 4 (2020), 
https://doc.delaware.gov/assets/documents/policies/policy_11-E-14.pdf [perma.cc/R3X9-
S4NV]; CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., GUIDELINES 
FOR REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR GENDER AFFIRMING SURGERY, supra note 16; OKLA. DEP’T. OF 
CORR., OP-140147 DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF INMATES WITH GENDER 
DYSPHORIA (2020), http://doc.publishpath.com/Websites/doc/images/Documents/Policy/op1 
40147.pdf [perma.cc/97UW-EQTR]. While the Massachusetts Department of Correction’s 
guidelines for treating transgender individuals do not expressly mention SRS, they do pro-
vide for an individualized treatment plan that must comply with “the most current version” 
of the WPATH Standards of Care, implying that SRS would fall within the possible scope of 
treatment. See MASS. DEP’T. OF CORR., IDENTIFICATION, TREATMENT AND CORRECTIONAL 
MANAGEMENT OF INMATES DIAGNOSED WITH GENDER DYSPHORIA 9 (2017), https://www.mas 
s.gov/files/documents/2016/09/qz/652.pdf [perma.cc/H66P-6DSP]. 
37  DEL. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 36, at 4. 
38  OKLA. DEP’T. OF CORR., supra note 36, at 5. The policy further specifies that self-
castration does not constitute “surgical reassignment therapy and will not qualify an” indi-
vidual to be housed “in a facility for [persons] of the opposite sex from the inmate’s birth 
sex.” Id. 
39  CAL. CORR. HEALTH CARE SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., GUIDELINES FOR 
REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR GENDER AFFIRMING SURGERY, supra note 16, at 1–4. 
40  See id. at 2. 
41  This does not include any distress caused by confinement or other mental illness. Id. at 3. 
42  Id. 
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Committee’s recommendation is then sent to a final committee,43 which can 
grant the SRS request, with or without conditions, or deny it.44 
 California also recently changed its general policy relating to incarcerated 
persons with gender dysphoria. In May 2019, the state’s Senate passed Senate 
Bill 132 by twenty-nine votes to eight.45 The Bill addresses the “exceptionally 
high rates of sexual victimization” faced by incarcerated transgender individu-
als by outlining classification and housing guidelines for these individuals.46 
Per the Bill, upon initial intake, the CDCR will ask each individual about gen-
der identity, sex assigned at birth, and preferred first name, gender pronoun, 
and honorific.47 CDCR staff are required to use the individual’s preferred gen-
der pronoun and honorific, and an individual may change that preference at any 
time.48  
 A more controversial aspect of the Bill deals with housing determinations 
for transgender incarcerated persons. Per the Bill, the CDCR is required to 
house the individual in “a correctional facility designated for men or women 
based on the individual’s preference . . . .”49 Because the Bill does not require a 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria or any other physical or mental health diagnosis, 
regardless of anatomy to apply,50 conservative groups and anti-transgender 
feminist groups alike have raised concerns over the threat that a transgender 
female might pose if housed at a female prison.51 Still, the Bill does provide for 
the housing of an individual in a manner contrary to the person’s perception of 
health and safety, so long as the CDCR outlines its “management or security 
concerns” related to the individual’s housing assignment in writing.52 Prison 
policies relating to housing, property, and medical treatment have a profound 
impact on a transgender person’s time while incarcerated. Where prison poli-
cies do not provide transgender individuals with adequate medical treatment for 
 
43  The recommendation is sent to the Statewide Medical Authorization Review Team. Id. at 
1. 
44  Id. at 4. 
45  S.B. 132, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at 3. The Bill defines “honorific” as “a form of respectful address typically combined 
with an individual’s surname.” Id 
48  Id. 
49  Id. at 4. 
50  Id. at 3–4. 
51  See, e.g., Madeleine Kearns, California’s Transgender Prison Policy Is a Disaster for 
Women, NAT’L. REV. (June 26, 2019, 4:41 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/06/ca 
lifornias-transgender-prison-policy-is-a-disaster-for-women/ [perma.cc/25UV-NP3G]. At the 
California assembly hearing on the Bill, Abigail Lunetta, a “Democrat, feminist, 
and . . . advocate for women’s rights,” raised concerns about the Bill’s implications stating, 
“[r]ight now, Richard Masbruch, a trans-identified male, is currently housed with female in-
mates in Corona, even though he is serving time for targeting, raping, and torturing women. 
Under no circumstances is this morally justifiable.” Id. (emphasis omitted).  
52  S.B. 132 at 4. 
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gender dysphoria, the individual generally must sue for relief under the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual punishment. 
II. DELIBERATE MEDICAL INDIFFERENCE AS “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT” 
The history of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments has been summarized at length by courts and scholars alike.53 
Nevertheless, briefly tracing the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
allows us to arrive at the current legal standard for a claim of deliberate medical 
indifference. In its earliest cases, the Supreme Court discussed “cruel” and 
“unusual” separately but focused its holdings on the punishment’s degree of 
cruelty.54 Decades later in 1958, however, the Court announced a new Eighth 
Amendment analysis.55 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court noted that the words of the 
Eighth Amendment “are not precise,” and that its “scope is not static.”56 In-
stead, the Eighth Amendment must “draw its meaning from the evolving stand-
ards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”57 
Since Trop, this “standards of decency” rule has been used by the Supreme 
Court on different occasions to invalidate the use of the death penalty against 
juveniles,58 the mentally disabled,59 and child rapists.60 Even earlier, the rule 
was used to establish the Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate medical indif-
ference against incarcerated persons.61 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court heard a 
claim by J.W. Gamble, an individual incarcerated in the Texas Department of 
Corrections who injured his back while unloading cotton from a truck as a pris-
 
53  See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–73 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 316–28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment 
Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 573–80 (2010). See generally Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). 
54  Ryan, supra note 53, at 582–83. 
55  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958). 
56  Id. 
57  Id. at 101. 
58  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (“The conclusion that it would offend 
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time 
of his or her offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected pro-
fessional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the 
leading members of the Western European community.”). 
59  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“Construing and applying the Eighth 
Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that 
such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on 
the State's power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (citation omitted)). 
60  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008) (“The rule of evolving standards of 
decency with specific marks on the way to full progress and mature judgment means that 
resort to the [death] penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes and limited in its in-
stances of application.”). 
61  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976). 
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on work assignment.62 Despite the fact that prison medical personnel had seen 
Gamble seventeen times during a three-month period following the incident, 
Gamble alleged that the staff could have done more for his back injury “by way 
of diagnosis and treatment.”63 While explaining that mere negligent medical 
treatment would not violate the Eighth Amendment,64 the Court held that “de-
liberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription against “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” 
and offends society’s “evolving standards of decency.”65 
The Supreme Court explained the deliberate indifference test in Farmer v. 
Brennan.66 There, a transgender individual, Dee Farmer, sued the Federal Bu-
reau of Prisons after she was transferred to a high-security prison where she 
was beaten and raped by another incarcerated person.67 The Court rejected 
Farmer’s invitation to adopt an entirely objective deliberate indifference test.68 
Instead, the Court required subjective proof that a prison official “both be 
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 
of serious harm exists, and [that] he must also draw the inference.”69 
Several circuit courts of appeals have applied this “Farmer framework” to 
deliberate medical indifference claims of incarcerated persons with a range of 
health conditions, including pregnancy,70 HIV,71 diabetes,72 hepatitis C,73 and 
cataracts.74 A claim of deliberate medical indifference is also the vehicle by 
which an individual with gender dysphoria can challenge the adequacy of the 
medical treatment provided by the prison.75 To prevail on a claim of deliberate 
medical indifference under Farmer, plaintiffs must satisfy a test comprising 
one objective prong and one subjective prong.76 The plaintiff must first demon-
 
62  Id. at 98–99. 
63  Id. at 107. Gamble argued, and the Fifth Circuit agreed, that the medical staff ought to 
have ordered an x-ray to better diagnose the injury. Id. The Supreme Court ultimately reject-
ed this argument. Id.  
64  Id. at 105–106 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 
because the victim is a prisoner.”). 
65  Id. at 104, 106. 
66  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
67  Id. at 829–30. 
68  Id. at 837. 
69  Id. 
70  Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 1987). 
71  Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991). 
72  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 193 (3d Cir. 1999). 
73  Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2011). 
74  Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2014). 
75  See discussion infra Part III. 
76  See, e.g., Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The test for constitutional 
liability of prison officials ‘involves both an objective and a subjective component.’ ” (cita-
tion omitted)); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To show that a pris-
on official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy 
both an objective and a subjective inquiry.” (citations omitted)); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 
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strate the existence, objectively, of a serious medical need.77 The plaintiff must 
then prove that a prison official both knew of and disregarded a serious risk to 
the individual’s health or safety.78 For individuals incarcerated in state facili-
ties, deliberate medical indifference claims are generally brought under § 1983 
of the U.S. Code, which enables the plaintiff to sue for damages or for an in-
junction.79 
III. THE SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY CASES 
The First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have addressed whether prisons are re-
quired to provide incarcerated persons with SRS to adequately treat gender 
dysphoria under the Eighth Amendment.80 The First and Ninth Circuit conclud-
ed that departments of correction are required to provide transgender persons 
with an individualized assessment for whether SRS is appropriate in each 
case.81 The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, held that a blanket ban on SRS for 
incarcerated persons would not run afoul the Eighth Amendment.82 This Part 
summarizes each case in turn. 
 
F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The deliberate indifference standard embodies both an objective 
and a subjective prong.”). 
77  Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In the 
deliberate medical indifference context, circuit courts of appeals agree that a “serious” medi-
cal need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that 
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's atten-
tion.” See, e.g., Leite v. Bergeron, 911 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2018); Richmond v. Huq, 885 
F.3d 928, 938 (6th Cir. 2018); Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 
(4th Cir. 2017); Kuhne v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 745 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2014); King v. 
Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012); Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 
(10th Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit uses the same test nearly word-for-word, only substitut-
ing “requiring” for “mandating.” See, e.g., Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 
320 (3d Cir. 2005). 
78  Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066 (citation omitted); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
837 (1994). 
79  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). In each of the cases discussed below, the plaintiff 
sued for an injunction requiring a correctional department to provide the person with SRS. 
This Note does not discuss each court’s preliminary injunction analysis but addresses only 
the merits of each person’s Eighth Amendment claim. 
80  The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue in Campbell v. Kallas; however, that decision 
was a review of the district court’s denying of the defendants’ claim of qualified immunity. 
Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2019). The court concluded that there was 
not enough case law to establish a constitutional right to treatment of gender dysphoria be-
yond hormone therapy. Id. at 549. While the court did note that it was “doubtful” whether 
the plaintiff could prove deliberate medical indifference, id. at 538, its analysis did not reach 
the merits of her claim. 
81  Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 794 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Edmo II”); Kosilek v. Spen-
cer, 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Kosilek IV”). 
82  Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 216 (2019). 
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A. Kosilek v. Spencer 
In the First Circuit, an incarcerated individual with gender dysphoria, 
Michelle Kosilek, had been denied SRS by the Massachusetts Department of 
Correction (“MDOC”) due to security concerns and disagreements over wheth-
er the procedure was medically necessary.83 Kosilek, who was eventually con-
victed of strangling her then-wife before leaving the body in the backseat of a 
vehicle at a shopping mall, had made an attempt at self-castration and two at-
tempts at suicide while awaiting her trial.84 By the time Kosilek reached the 
First Circuit’s en banc review, the “litigation [had] spanned more than twenty 
years and [had] produced several opinions of significant length.”85 
In a sixty-plus page opinion that followed a twenty-eight-day trial, the dis-
trict court applied the WPATH Standards of Care and noted that SRS was 
“widely recognized” as medically necessary for the treatment of gender dys-
phoria. 86 In conducting its Eighth Amendment analysis, the court found that 
Kosilek’s gender dysphoria was indeed a serious medical need.87 Then, while 
explaining that an incarcerated individual is not entitled to “ideal care or the 
care of his [or her] choice,” the court found that SRS was the only adequate 
treatment for Kosilek’s gender dysphoria, crediting the testimony of her expert 
witnesses.88 
 
83  Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 74–81. 
84  Id. at 68–69. The murder of Kosilek’s wife was precipitated by an argument over Kosilek 
wearing her wife’s clothing. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 213 (D. Mass. 
2012) (“Kosilek II”). 
85  Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 68. Kosilek’s odyssey in the federal courts commenced in 1992 
with a lawsuit that spanned ten years. Kosilek v. Maloney 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 
2002) (“Kosilek I”). While not discussed herein, this Note takes the First Circuit’s lead in 
designating Kosilek v. Maloney as “Kosilek I.” See Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 68. Thus, at the 
risk of confusing the reader, the first case discussed in depth in this Note (the District 
Court’s Kosilek v. Spencer decision) is designated herein as “Kosilek II.” The First Circuit’s 
first review of that decision is designated “Kosilek III.” And the First Circuit’s en banc opin-
ion is designated “Kosilek IV.” 
86  Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (2012). The “Harry Benjamin Standards of Care” that 
the court cites were the precursors to the WPATH Standards of Care. See WPATH, supra 
note 8, at 107. The United States Tax Court had recently held that hormonal treatments and 
SRS could be tax deductible for certain individuals as forms of necessary medical care, and 
the Seventh Circuit had recently struck down a Wisconsin state statute prohibiting hormonal 
treatments and SRS for incarcerated persons as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 77 (2010); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th 
Cir. 2011). 
87  Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 229–30. 
88  Id. at 199, 225–27. The court repudiated the defendant’s expert witness and deemed him 
“not a prudent professional for several reasons.” Id. at 235. Among the court’s reasons were 
Dr. Schmidt’s rejection of “certain fundamental features” of the Standards of Care, his belief 
that SRS is never medically necessary, and his belief that an incarcerated person cannot have 
a “real life experience” as required by the Standards of Care. Id. 
21 NEV. L.J. 405 
416 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
Next, the court found that MDOC Commissioner Kathleen Dennehy actu-
ally knew that Kosilek had a serious medical need.89 It deemed MDOC’s con-
tention that Kosilek was denied SRS because of security concerns as pretextual 
and found Dennehy’s conduct to be wanton, in violation of the Eight Amend-
ment.90 In making this determination, the court pointed to Dennehy’s participa-
tion in firing an MDOC doctor who had recommended SRS for Kosilek and her 
immediately halting the treatment of transgender persons upon becoming Act-
ing Commissioner of MDOC (purportedly to review each individual case).91 
The court also found that she had offered false testimony, claiming to have 
misunderstood that MDOC’s medical consultants were recommending SRS for 
Kosilek. 92 Throughout the opinion, the court offered scathing criticism of 
Dennehy, asserting that she was “determined not to be the first prison official in 
the United States to authorize [SRS] for an inmate,” and that she opposed 
Kosilek’s SRS only out of fear of facing political backlash from the media.93 
The court took particular offense to the fact that Dennehy had testified under 
oath that she would “retire rather than obey an order from the Supreme Court” 
to provide SRS for an individual incarcerated by MDOC.94 
The First Circuit’s first review of Kosilek II was released approximately 
eighteen months after the district court’s order.95 After “setting forth the exten-
sive backdrop of Kosilek’s odyssey,”96 the court held that the trial judge had 
neither erred in finding that Kosilek suffered from a serious medical need that 
 
89  Id. at 238. 
90  Id. at 238–47. 
91  Id. at 240. 
92  Id. (“The court finds that Dennehy was pretending not to understand UMass’s treatment 
recommendations in order to delay having to announce that she would not allow Kosilek to 
receive [SRS].”). 
93  Id. at 203, 220. The Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor had publicly opposed using tax 
revenues to provide incarcerated persons with SRS, id. at 225, and the Boston Globe had 
published a series of incendiary articles opposing Kosilek’s petition. See e.g., Brian 
McGrory, A Test Case for a Change, BOS. GLOBE (June 13, 2000), https://www.bostonglobe. 
com/metro/2000/06/13/test-case-for-change/s9jYsy33HXfJ3ajRNZYpMO/story.html [perma 
.cc/HK92-P22R] (“Now in prison . . . [Kosilek] says he pines every moment of every day to 
be the woman he was always meant to be. And he’s demanding that the state, meaning you 
and me, pay the $25,000 for a sex-change operation, which the more politically correct call a 
‘sexual reassignment.’ ”); Eileen McNamara, When Gender Isn’t Relevant, BOS. GLOBE 
(June 11, 2006), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/06/11/when_gender_isnt 
_relevant/ [perma.cc/N8GZ-E3MG] (“The [Kosilek] trial underway in federal court in Bos-
ton is not about the rights of transsexuals. It’s about the manipulations of a murderer.”); 
Globe Editorial, Set Limits on Sex Change, BOS. GLOBE (June 15, 2006), http://archive.bosto 
n.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2006/06/15/set_limits_on_sex_change
/ [perma.cc/5JYF-LFVJ] (“Kosilek’s case is not compelling for reasons even beyond the ob-
vious distastefulness of a wife killer angling to serve out his sentence of life without parole 
in a women’s prison.”). 
94  Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201, 220, 228. 
95  Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Kosilek III”). 
96  Id. at 758. The court wrote an approximately twenty-two-page summary of the litigation. 
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could only be adequately treated by SRS, nor in finding that MDOC’s security 
rationale for denying Kosilek the surgery was “largely false and greatly exag-
gerated.”97 While acknowledging that Kosilek’s procedure may “strike[] some 
as odd or unorthodox,” the First Circuit was ultimately unwilling to overturn 
the trial judge, who the court determined was “well-placed” to make the find-
ings that he did.98 In a dissent that foreshadowed the ultimate reversal of the 
district court’s decision, Judge Torruella argued that the majority based its 
opinion on “several erroneous assumptions” and reached a result “beyond the 
limits of [the court’s] established Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”99 
Judge Torruella also wrote the majority opinion for the First Circuit’s re-
versal—and ultimate dismissal—of Kosilek’s case en banc.100 In first analyzing 
the objective prong of Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment claim, the court acknowl-
edged that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need and then focused on the 
district court’s finding that MDOC’s treatment of Kosilek’s gender dysphoria 
was constitutionally inadequate.101 The court determined that MDOC’s medical 
experts’ views were within the range of medical prudence and cited “several 
erroneous determinations” made by the district court in finding the contrary. 102 
The court further held that MDOC’s treatment plan for Kosilek was not suffi-
ciently harmful so as to violate the Eighth Amendment and admonished the dis-
trict court for “unduly minimiz[ing] the nature of [MDOC’s] preferred treat-
ment plan.”103 The court found no basis for accepting Kosilek’s contention that 
denying her SRS would result in a de facto blanket ban against MDOC provid-
ing SRS for incarcerated individuals with gender dysphoria.104 It did, however, 
 
97  Id. at 766, 772. 
98  Id. at 772–73 (“Here the trial judge had the opportunity to preside over two lawsuits in-
volving the same players and similar allegations, to hear evidence in this case over the 
course of a twenty-eight day trial, to question witnesses, to assess credibility, to review a 
large volume of exhibits, and, in general, to live with this case for twelve years (twenty years 
if you count [Kosilek’s initial litigation]). The judge was well-placed to make the factual 
findings he made, and there is certainly evidentiary support for those findings.”). 
99  Id. at 773 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
100  Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 68.  
101  Id. at 85–90. 
102  Id. at 87. These erroneous determinations included a misrepresentation of the flexibility 
of the WPATH Standards of Care, a mischaracterization of MDOC’s medical experts’ “re-
fusal” to issue letters of recommendation for SRS, and an overstatement regarding consensus 
in the medical community as to the “real-life experience” required by the Standards of Care. 
Id. at 86–89. 
103  Id. at 89. The court took issue with the fact that the district court limited its ruling to find 
that “psychotherapy and antidepressants alone would not adequately treat Kosilek’s [gender 
dysphoria]” while disregarding the fact that MDOC also provided Kosilek with hormone 
therapy, facial hair removal, regular mental health treatment, and feminine clothing and ac-
cessories, with (as conceded by Kosilek) much success. Id. at 89–90. 
104  Id. at 90–91. The dissent was less concerned about MDOC creating a blanket ban on SRS 
and more concerned that the majority’s decision would “preclude inmates from ever being 
able to mount a successful Eighth Amendment claim for [SRS] in the courts.” Id. at 106–07 
(Thompson, J., dissenting). 
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warn that such a ban would “conflict with the requirement that medical care be 
individualized based on a particular prisoner’s serious medical needs.”105 
Proceeding to its analysis of the subjective prong of Kosilek’s claim 
(whether MDOC acted with deliberate indifference towards her), the First Cir-
cuit clarified that the focus lay not with the district court’s belief about what 
was medically necessary, but with the MDOC staff’s knowledge.106 The court 
held that, in this case, MDOC had reasonably chosen between two alternative 
treatment paths accepted by medical professionals.107 It further pointed out that 
even a later court ruling, in which a prison’s administrators erred in their esti-
mation of a treatment’s reasonableness, does not amount to “the sort of obsti-
nacy and disregard” required for a finding of deliberate indifference.108 
Finally, the court addressed the MDOC security concerns, which the dis-
trict court had spurned.109 Once more explaining the importance of whether 
MDOC’s security concerns had a “reasoned basis,” rather than the immateriali-
ty of the district court’s belief regarding the accuracy of those concerns, the 
court found MDOC’s security concerns to be reasonable.110 The court main-
tained that it took “no great stretch of the imagination” to recognize reasonable 
security concerns related to where the department might house a male-to-
female transgender individual who had been convicted of “extreme violence 
against a female domestic partner.”111 It also found that MDOC’s concerns, 
which involved future individuals using threats of suicide or self-harm as a 
means of extracting desired benefits from the department of corrections, consti-
tuted a reasonable security concern.112 While the court gave deference to the 
district court’s rejection of Commissioner Dennehy as a credible witness, this 
was insufficient to affirm the district court’s ruling that MDOC’s security con-
cerns were wholly pretextual—particularly because Dennehy had left her posi-
tion years prior to the decision to deny Kosilek’s SRS being made.113 Over 
twenty years after originally suing for injunctive relief to obtain SRS, Kosilek’s 
request was denied. 
B. Gibson v. Collier 
Four years after Kosilek IV, in Gibson v. Collier,114 the Fifth Circuit held 
that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) was not required to 
make individualized assessments for each individual requesting SRS and that 
 
105  Id. at 91 (citation omitted); see discussion infra Section IV.A. 
106  Kosilek IV, 774 F3d at 91. 
107  Id. at 90. 
108  Id. at 92. 
109  Id. at 92–96. 
110  Id. at 93–94. 
111  Id. at 93. 
112  Id. at 94. 
113  Id. at 95–96. 
114  Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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failing to provide SRS could not fall within the plain meaning of “cruel and 
unusual” punishment.115 Originally incarcerated on two counts of aggravated 
robbery, Vanessa Lynn Gibson subsequently committed aggravated assault, 
possession of a deadly weapon, and murder in prison.116 She had been diag-
nosed with gender dysphoria and had lived as a female since the age of fif-
teen.117 She had attempted self-castration and three times attempted suicide—
although she admits that the suicide attempts were not solely because of her 
gender dysphoria.118  
After having been repeatedly denied SRS by TDCJ, Gibson brought suit 
challenging TDCJ’s policy relating to the treatment of transgender individuals 
and seeking an injunction requiring TDCJ to evaluate her for SRS.119 While 
whether the policy was merely silent about SRS or proscribed it entirely was 
unclear on its face, the court noted that the policy was a “categorical policy 
judgment not to wade into the controversial world of [SRS].”120 TDCJ’s Direc-
tor moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and sovereign 
immunity.121 The district court rejected both defenses but nevertheless granted 
summary judgment, ruling sua sponte that Gibson’s Eighth Amendment claim 
failed on the merits.122 On appeal, despite “procedural defects” at the lower 
court, which “might very well” have been reason for remand, Gibson and her 
counsel requested that the court remand based solely on the merits.123 The Fifth 
Circuit accepted her invitation to reach the merits of her claim. 
 Proceeding on a “sparse record” that included only the WPATH Standards 
of Care, the Fifth Circuit first noted (and indeed, TDCJ acknowledged) that 
Gibson’s gender dysphoria was, objectively, a serious medical need.124 The 
court also noted, however, that disagreement over medical treatment would not 
be enough to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference.125 According to 
the court, Gibson “seem[ed] to accept” that fact and had stated in her brief that 
to prevail, she must demonstrate “universal acceptance by the medical commu-
nity” that SRS was required to treat gender dysphoria.126 Ultimately, Gibson’s 
 
115  Id. at 224–28. 
116  Id. at 216–17. 
117  Id. at 217. In a footnote, the court explains that the opinion would use male pronouns 
when referring to Gibson, citing TDCJ policy and Supreme Court precedent. Id. n.2. 
118  Id. at 217. 
119  Id. at 217–18. 
120  Id. at 218, 224. 
121  Id. at 218. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 218–19 (“Reasonable counsel might conclude that it would be a waste of time and 
resources for everyone involved (and give false hope to Gibson) to remand for procedural 
reasons.”). 
124  Id. at 219, 221. 
125  Id. at 220. 
126  Id. 
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inability to do so “doom[ed]” her claim.127 Citing the Kosilek IV court’s “ex-
haustively detailed” summary of the expert testimony presented at trial in that 
case, the Gibson court noted that “respected doctors profoundly disagree about 
whether [SRS] is medically necessary to [adequately] treat gender dyspho-
ria.”128 Because Gibson would never be able to prove the medical community’s 
consensus regarding SRS, the court rejected Gibson’s assertion that she could 
present evidence on remand that would demonstrate her individual need for 
SRS.129 
 The Fifth Circuit rejected the dissent’s contention that permitting a blanket 
ban on SRS would be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.130 It noted 
that Gibson had acknowledged in her brief, and her counsel had conceded at 
oral argument, that “if the logic of Kosilek [IV] is correct, it would allow a 
‘blanket refusal to provide SRS.’ ”131 The court then proceeded to cite the 
Kosilek IV dissent as sister circuit precedent approving this blanket ban on SRS 
for incarcerated persons.132 It concluded this analysis by comparing how the 
Food and Drug Administration makes categorical judgments about which med-
ical treatments may or may not be made available to American citizens without 
an individualized assessment in each case.133 
Having concluded that Gibson’s inability to prove medical consensus about 
SRS doomed her claim “as a matter of established precedent,” the court pro-
ceeded (almost as an aside) to address “an even more fundament flaw” with her 
claim.134 Quoting various opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia, a Yale Law Jour-
nal article, and Webster’s Dictionary, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits only punishments that are both cruel and unusu-
al.135 If a practice to deny transgender individuals SRS is widely accepted, the 
argument went, then TDCJ doing so could not be tantamount to an “unusual” 
 
127  Id. at 221. 
128  Id. at 221–23. The Gibson dissent challenged the majority’s use of the Kosilek record to 
reach its conclusion. Id. at 232 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). While the majority conceded “it 
might have been better practice” to have had evidence from the TDCJ, it concluded that this 
was not grounds for reversal, as there was “no reason why—as a matter of either common 
sense or constitutional law—one state cannot rely on the universally shared experiences and 
policy determinations of other states.” Id. at 224. 
129  Id. at 223–24 (“Because Gibson does not dispute the expert testimony assembled by the 
First Circuit concerning the medical debate surrounding [SRS], [s]he cannot establish on re-
mand that such surgery is universally accepted as an effective or necessary treatment for 
gender dysphoria. Nor can [s]he contend that TDCJ has been deliberately indifferent to [her] 
serious medical needs—particularly where TDCJ continues to treat [her] gender dysphoria 
through other means.” (citation omitted)). 
130  Id. at 224–25. 
131  Id. at 225. 
132  Id. Ironically, the Kosilek IV court specifically warned against such an interpretation. 
Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d at 90–91; see discussion infra Section IV.A. 
133  Gibson, 920 F.3d at 225. 
134  Id. at 226 
135  Id. at 226–28. 
21 NEV. L.J. 405 
Fall 2020] A (CRUEL AND) UNUSUAL DECISION 421 
punishment.136 The court noted that SRS had only been provided to an incar-
cerated individual once—and then as a part of a settlement agreement137—and 
thus concluded that Gibson could not “state a claim for cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the plain text and original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, 
regardless of any facts [she] might have presented in the event of remand.”138 
C. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc. 
In a decision that signaled the direction the Ninth Circuit would take in 
cases involving incarcerated persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria, the dis-
trict court in Norsworthy v. Beard granted a plaintiff’s motion for preliminary 
injunction and ordered the CDCR to provide her with SRS.139 The case was ini-
tiated by Michelle-Lael Norsworthy shortly after the District of Massachusetts’ 
Kosilek II decision (later reversed, as discussed above), which required the 
Massachusetts Department of Correction to provide SRS to Ms. Kosilek. 140 
Norsworthy had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria141 approximately twelve 
years prior to filing her complaint and had been denied SRS by CDCR on three 
levels of appeal.142 
 The district court in Norsworthy outlined the WPATH Standards of Care, 
which CDCR did not dispute as the accepted standards of care for the treatment 
of patients diagnosed with gender dysphoria.143 In analyzing Norsworthy’s de-
liberate medical indifference claim, the court applied WPATH’s SRS eligibility 
criteria to find that Norsworthy was likely to satisfy the “serious medical need” 
prong of the Farmer framework,144 while soundly rejecting the opinions of 
CDCR’s expert witness.145 The court further found that Norsworthy had pro-
vided compelling evidence showing that CDCR acted with deliberate indiffer-
ence by failing to provide her with SRS, despite having access “to the relevant 
Standards of Care and evidence that SRS was medically necessary for Nors-
worthy.”146 While the Ninth Circuit ultimately dismissed the injunction as 
 
136  Id. at 226–27. 
137  See Quine v. Beard, No. 14-CV-02726, 2017 WL 1540758, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 
2017). 
138  Gibson, 920 F.3d at 228. 
139  Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
140  Id. at 1173–74; see also Kosilek IV, 744 F.3d 63. 
141  Gender dysphoria was generally known as “gender identity disorder” at the time Nors-
worthy was diagnosed in January 2000. Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1170. 
142  Id. at 1174–76. 
143  Id. at 1170–71, 1186. 
144  Id. at 1187; see discussion supra Part II. 
145  Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1188 (“The Court gives very little weight to the opinions 
of Levine, whose report misrepresents the Standards of Care; overwhelmingly relies on gen-
eralizations about gender dysphoric prisoners, rather than an individualized assessment of 
Norsworthy; contains illogical inferences; and admittedly includes references to a fabricated 
anecdote.”). 
146  Id. at 1189. 
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moot,147 the district court’s opinion has been echoed in subsequent cases within 
the Circuit. 
 While the Norsworthy litigation was progressing, Shiloh Quine, a 
transgender individual also housed by CDCR, brought an action seeking both 
“access to adequate medical care, including [SRS],” and “structural changes 
[to] CDCR’s treatment of transgender [individuals].”148 The parties eventually 
reached a settlement agreement, the terms of which were shared with the court 
during a settlement conference.149 CDCR agreed to (and did) provide Quine 
with SRS.150 CDCR further agreed to revise its policies concerning medically 
necessary treatment, including surgery for transgender individuals, as well as 
its policies concerning the gender-specific items that transgender individuals 
would be allowed to possess.151 
In complying with the settlement agreement, CDCR revised its regulations 
to permit identified persons to possess clothing corresponding to their gender 
identities instead of clothing corresponding with their sex assigned at birth.152 
CDCR also established the “Transgender Inmates Authorized Personal Property 
Schedule,” which expanded the personal property, including hygiene items, that 
transgender individuals could possess.153 Finally, pursuant to the settlement 
agreement, only CDCR medical or mental health staff were permitted to identi-
fy individuals as transgender or as suffering from gender dysphoria.154 
 The most recent case from the Ninth Circuit involving a transgender incar-
cerated person’s right to SRS commenced in the District of Idaho in December 
2018.155 Adree Edmo entered the custody of the Idaho Department of Correc-
tions (IDOC) in 2012, where, shortly thereafter, an IDOC psychiatrist diag-
 
147  See Norsworthy v. Beard, 802 F.3d 1090, 1091–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissing CDCR’s 
appeal because the action had been rendered moot by the fact that Norsworthy was released 
from prison one day prior to oral argument). This is not the only case where a transgender 
individual has suddenly been paroled after a correctional department was ordered to provide 
treatment for gender dysphoria. See Beth Schwartzapfel, Were These Transgender Prisoners 
Paroled—Or Just Kicked Out?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://w 
ww.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/08/were-these-transgender-prisoners-paroled-or-just-kic 
ked-out [perma.cc/H5DT-WKBN]. 
148  Quine v. Beard, No. 14-CV-02726, 2017 WL 1540758, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017). 
149  Id. While the details of the settlement agreement are provided in a different case, where 
CDCR’s compliance with the agreement was challenged (litigation that proceeded to the 
Ninth Circuit), for the sake of remaining within the scope of this Note, I will only discuss the 
relevant portions of the settlement agreement, and not the subsequent litigation. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
152  Quine v. Kernan, 741 F. App’x 358, 360 (9th Cir. 2018); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
15 § 3030(c) (West, Westlaw through 8/21/20 Register 2020, No. 34). 
153  Quine, 741 F. App’x at 360; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 § 3190(d) (West, Westlaw 
through 8/21/20 Register 2020, No. 34). 
154  Quine, 741 F. App’x at 362. 
155  Edmo v. Idado Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (D. Idaho 2018) (“Edmo I”). 
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nosed her with gender dysphoria.156 Despite achieving the maximum physical 
changes associated with the hormone therapy that IDOC provided, Edmo con-
tinued to experience “extreme gender dysphoria,” resulting in habitual cutting 
to relieve emotional pain and two attempts at self-castration.157 IDOC refused 
to provide Edmo with SRS, contending that SRS was not medically necessary 
to adequately treat Edmo’s gender dysphoria.158 
 After first pausing to place its decision in the context of confronting “the 
full breadth and meaning” of the “Rule of Law,”159 the court outlined the 
WPATH Standards of Care and eligibility criteria for SRS.160 Citing the Stand-
ards of Care as the only “evidence-based standards . . . accepted 
by . . . nationally or internationally recognized medical professional groups,”161 
the court found that Edmo satisfied the necessary eligibility criteria to receive 
SRS and thus satisfied the “serious medical need” prong of her claim.162 
The district court gave “virtually no weight” to the opinions of IDOC’s ex-
perts (one of whom was the same expert chided by the Norsworthy court)163 
and refuted the experts’ claim that Edmo would be unable to satisfy WPATH’s 
criteria because she “[had] not presented as female outside of the prison set-
ting.”164 Rather, the court found that the Standards of Care explicitly apply “in 
their entirety,” irrespective of the patient being housed in “institutional envi-
ronments such as prisons,” and that denial of SRS because of residence in a 
prison is not a reasonable accommodation.165 
Proceeding to the subjective prong of Edmo’s claim, the court held that 
IDOC had misapplied the “recognized standards of care” for treating 
transgender patients and had trained its staff “with materials that discourage re-
ferrals for [SRS] and represent the opinions of a single person who rejects the 
WPATH Standards of Care.”166 The court further found that IDOC had ignored 
Edmo’s medical needs by failing to provide her with SRS “despite her actual 
harm and ongoing risk of future harm, including self-castration attempts, cut-
ting, and suicidal ideation.”167 The court found that IDOC and its medical pro-
vider, Corizon, Inc., had implemented a virtual blanket policy of denying SRS 
 
156  Id. at 1109. Edmo’s diagnosis was thereafter confirmed by an IDOC psychologist. Id. 
157  Id. at 1109–10. 
158  Id. at 1118–19. 
159  Id. at 1109. 
160  Id. at 1111–13. 
161  Id. at 1125. 
162  Id. at 1124–27. 
163  Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also supra note 
145. 
164  Edmo I, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1125–26. 
165  Id. at 1125; see also WPATH, supra note 8, at 67–68. 
166  Edmo I, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1126. 
167  Id. at 1126–27. 
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to transgender persons for “reasons unrelated to her medical need.”168 As such, 
the district court determined that Edmo was likely to prove that IDOC had 
treated her with deliberate indifference.169 The court ordered IDOC to provide 
Edmo with adequate medical care, including providing her with SRS within six 
months of the decision.170 
In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court to rule in 
favor of an incarcerated person requesting SRS.171 Noting the judiciary’s re-
sponsibility to remedy violations of the Eighth Amendment, the court reviewed 
Adree Edmo’s situation giving deference to the district court’s factual find-
ings.172 The court noted that IDOC did not dispute that SRS may be medically 
necessary in certain situations, and that the parties’ dispute was based on 
whether SRS was medically necessary for Edmo.173 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the district court’s factual findings were “amply supported” by the evidence 
and testimony produced during “four months of intensive discovery and a 
three-day evidentiary hearing.”174 Framing the appeal as a disagreement over 
the implications of the district court’s factual findings, the court proceeded to 
analyze Edmo’s deliberate medical indifference claim using the Farmer 
framework.175 
IDOC did not dispute that Edmo’s gender dysphoria triggered its Eighth 
Amendment obligations.176 Additionally, multiple courts had previously held 
that gender dysphoria constitutes a “serious medical need” under the Eighth 
Amendment.177 These courts included the Ninth Circuit (previously),178 the 
First Circuit,179 the Eighth Circuit,180 and the Seventh Circuit.181 Edmo still had 
the burden of showing that the treatment plan that IDOC used in her case was 
“medically unacceptable under the circumstances.”182 Consequently, “[t]he 
 
168  Id. at 1127 (citing Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1192). The Norsworthy court had also 
found that CDCR effectuated a blanket policy barring transgender individuals from receiving 
SRS because CDCR’s guidelines for treatment of transgender individuals “did not [include] 
SRS as a treatment option,” and because CDCR provided a training to its staff, “indicat[ing] 
that SRS should never be provided to incarcerated [individuals].” See Norsworthy, 87 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1191. 
169  Edmo I, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1127. 
170  Id. at 1129. 
171  Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Edmo II”). 
172  Id. at 766–67. 
173  Id. at 767. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. at 767–68. 
176  Id. at 785. 
177  Id. 
178  Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2015). 
179  Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014).  
180  White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988). 
181  Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987). 
182  Edmo II, 935 F.3d at 786. 
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crux” of IDOC’s appeal was that it had provided Edmo with adequate and med-
ically acceptable care.183 
 Quoting the Fifth Circuit’s Gibson opinion to acknowledge that a differ-
ence of opinion between an incarcerated individual and a physician is insuffi-
cient to prove deliberate medical indifference,184 the Ninth Circuit explained 
that this is only the case where both “opinions are medically acceptable under 
the circumstances.”185 Considering the circumstances of Edmo’s case, the court 
held that Edmo had established that the treatment plan that IDOC’s medical 
staff provided was not medically acceptable.186 This conclusion was based on 
the district court’s findings, which the Ninth Circuit held were not made in 
clear error.187 Rather, the district court had permissibly credited the testimony 
of Edmo’s medical experts, who “logically and persuasively” applied the 
WPATH Standards of Care.188 The district court had also permissibly discredit-
ed the testimony of IDOC’s medical experts, who “lacked expertise” and mis-
applied (or did not attempt to apply) the WPATH Standards of Care.189 
 Turning to deliberate indifference, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with 
IDOC’s contention that its staff had not acted with “conscious disregard of an 
excessive risk” to Edmo’s health.190 Dr. Scott Eliason, the Corizon psychiatrist 
responsible for Edmo’s treatment, had continued with Edmo’s ineffective 
treatment plan after Edmo’s first self-castration attempt, despite acknowledging 
that the incident indicated that her gender dysphoria “had risen to another lev-
el.”191 Dr. Eliason had again refused to reevaluate Edmo’s treatment plan after 
her second self-castration attempt.192 
IDOC raised two arguments against a finding of deliberate medical indif-
ference. First, no defendant, including Dr. Eliason, intended to inflict pain upon 
Edmo; and second, because IDOC had provided Edmo with some care, no de-
fendant could have acted with deliberate indifference.193 The court rejected both 
of these arguments.194 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, prevailing on an Eighth 
Amendment claim does not require a showing of malice or intent to harm the 
 
183  Id. 
184  Id.; see also Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2019). 
185  Edmo II, 935 F.3d at 786. 
186  Id. 
187  Id.  
188  Id. at 787–92. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. at 792–93. 
191  Id. at 793. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. 
194  Id. 
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plaintiff;195 and “even extensive treatment over a period of years” does not im-
munize prison administrators from Eighth Amendment claims.196 
The Ninth Circuit, unlike the Fifth Circuit, limited its decision to the facts 
of Edmo’s case.197 The court refused to speculate as to whether a future plain-
tiff might be able to meet the threshold necessary to prove an Eighth Amend-
ment violation.198 The forty-six-page Edmo II opinion concludes by remarking 
that the Ninth Circuit is not the first court, “nor will [it] be the last,” to weigh in 
on “an area of increased social awareness: transgender health care.”199 The 
court noted that Eighth Amendment inquiries take into account developing un-
derstanding of issues in light of the medical community’s ongoing information, 
research, and experience.200 The Ninth Circuit held that prison officials violate 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment where 
they deny a person SRS with full awareness of the medical necessity of SRS as 
treatment for gender dysphoria.201 
IV. GIBSON V. COLLIER: A (CRUEL AND) UNUSUAL DECISION 
Despite reaching opposite results for the respective plaintiffs, the First and 
Ninth Circuits came to the same conclusion regarding whether a prison may be 
required to provide SRS for a transgender individual: the decision must be 
made on a case-by-case basis after an individualized inquiry has been complet-
ed.202 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that a prison policy banning SRS for in-
carcerated persons altogether does not violate the Eighth Amendment.203 This 
decision largely flies in the face of established case law related to deliberate 
medical indifference,204 raising questions concerning how these claims might 
be decided in the Fifth Circuit moving forward. 
In hopes of providing some context for the Gibson court’s deviation from 
established precedent, it is worth briefly speculating about the underlying is-
sues that might have factored into the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion. One could ob-
viously posit, as Gibson’s attorney did, that this conclusion was an example of 
 
195  Id.; see also Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
196  Edmo II, 935 F.3d at 793. 
197  Id. at 767. 
198  Id. at 803. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
201  Id. 
202  Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63, 90–91 (noting that a blanket ban on SRS would “conflict with 
the requirement that medical care be individualized based on a particular prisoner’s serious 
medical needs” (citation omitted)); Edmo II, 935 F.3d at 796 (emphasizing “Eighth Amend-
ment precedent requiring a case-by-case determination of the medical necessity of a particu-
lar treatment”). 
203  Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A state does not inflict cruel and 
unusual punishment by declining to provide [SRS] to a transgender inmate.”). 
204  See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
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“the very worst sort of result-driven judicial activism.”205 Afterall, Judge Ho 
was appointed by President Donald Trump, whose administration rolled back 
policies favoring transgender individuals implemented by his predecessor.206 
Judge Ho insisted on misgendering Gibson throughout the opinion.207 And his 
conclusion was based, arguably, on an exaggeration of the medical debate sur-
rounding SRS at a time of backlash against the transgender rights movement.208 
However, beyond mere bias, a number of factors may influence any health care 
claim made by an incarcerated individual. 
Estimates show that 11 percent of annual prison spending nationally goes 
toward healthcare, with some states spending over 20 percent of annual budgets 
on healthcare for incarcerated persons.209 This spending comes out to over 
twelve billion dollars of public funding per year.210 So, a court might be wary 
of approving extra spending for healthcare which might not be medically nec-
essary for an incarcerated person. And, as exposed by Kosilek’s case, this in-
clination likely increases when controversial figures or procedures are in-
volved.211 Another explanation for the court’s decision might be the tendency to 
 
205  David Artavia, Supreme Court Rejects Inmate’s Case for Gender Confirmation Surgery, 
ADVOCATE (Dec. 10, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.advocate.com/transgender/2019/12/10/su 
preme-court-rejects-inmates-case-gender-confirmation-surgery [perma.cc/3VDN-XFKJ]. 
206  Id.; see Lola Fadulu, Trump’s Rollback of Transgender Rights Extends Through Entire 
Government, N.Y TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/us/politics/t 
rump-transgender-rights.html [perma.cc/E2UJ-KD47] (summarizing the steps President 
Trump has taken to roll back policies favoring transgender individuals). 
207  Harvard Law Review, Recent Case: Gibson v. Collier, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG (Apr. 12, 
2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/recent-case-_gibson-v-collier [perma.cc/3VMF-F3 
PW]. 
208  Id; see also Katelyn Burns, The Internet Made Trans People Visible. It Also Left Them 
More Vulnerable., VOX (Dec. 27, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/12/ 
27/21028342/trans-visibility-backlash-internet-2010 [perma.cc/HK3P-T55L] (chronicling 
the transgender rights movement and the backlash against it). 
209  CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS: 
EXAMINING STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 9 (2017), https://www.vera.org/downlo 
ads/publications/the-price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends.pdf [perma.cc/GC6Q-DNS 
W]. 
210  Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html [perma. 
cc/V4NG-8CXC]. 
211  See supra note 93. Policy related to transgender persons behind bars does not appear to 
have become any less polarizing or political in the years since the Boston Globe’s editorials. 
See e.g., Justine Coleman, Conservatives Slam Warren’s Call to Put Transgender Women in 
Women’s Prisons, HILL (Jan. 13, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4 
78054-conservatives-slam-warrens-call-to-put-trans-women-in-female-prisons [perma.cc/6V 
GB-5M7R] (summarizing the conservative response to Sen. Elizabeth Warren calling for 
male-to-female transgender individuals to be housed in women’s prisons); Ryan Saavedra, 
Warren: Inmates Are ‘Entitled’ To Taxpayer-Funded Transgender Surgery, DAILY WIRE 
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.dailywire.com/news/warren-inmates-are-entitled-to-taxpayer-fu 
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be suspicious, generally, that individuals might fake a disability to abuse disa-
bility laws and obtain a selfish advantage.212 This might be particularly con-
cerning where there is the possibility of a predator faking gender dysphoria to 
gain access to more victims.213 
Additionally, the Gibson decision, as it relates to legal precedent, was per-
haps less unusual when considering only Fifth Circuit case law and disregard-
ing its sister circuits. While the Fifth Circuit has indeed generally used 
Farmer’s two-prong deliberate medical indifference test in the past,214 the court 
had never previously addressed a blanket ban on a medical treatment for incar-
cerated persons. And while the court had never treated the phrase “cruel and 
unusual punishment” as a conjunctive test, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
Harmelin v. Michigan could provide Supreme Court precedent for this posi-
tion.215 So, Gibson, while unusual, might not have been such a radical break 
from precedent. 
Regardless of whether there were underlying reasons for coming to its de-
cision or not, and whatever those reasons might have been, the Gibson decision 
raises questions for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit mov-
ing forward. Do other procedures exist that might be subject to a blanket ban 
for incarcerated persons in the future? Has the Fifth Circuit chosen to abandon 
the Farmer framework for analyzing deliberate medical indifference altogeth-
er? Must a plaintiff now prove that her lack of treatment was both cruel and 
unusual? An affirmative answer to any of these questions is likely untenable 
under the weight of history and legal precedent. 
 
nded-transgender-surgery [perma.cc/F86K-BGYQ] (characterizing an event where presiden-
tial candidate Elizabeth Warren expressed support for SRS for incarcerated individuals with 
gender dysphoria who need it as “far-left” and calling Warren a “sexist”). 
212  Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud and Special Rights 
Discourse, 53 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1051, 1066 (2019) (“public suspicion of abuse of disabil-
ity laws and rights is indeed identifiable in public opinion”). 
213  See, e.g., Kearns, supra note 51. 
214  See, e.g., Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Finding a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment also requires a 
twofold analysis. [The plaintiff] must first prove objective exposure to a substantial risk of 
serious harm. Additionally, he must show that prison officials acted or failed to act with de-
liberate indifference to that risk.”); Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 
2002) (“The plaintiff must prove objectively that he was exposed to a substantial risk of se-
rious harm. . . . Additionally, the plaintiff must show that jail officials acted or failed to act 
with deliberate indifference to that risk. . . . The deliberate indifference standard is a subjec-
tive inquiry; the plaintiff must establish that the jail officials were actually aware of the risk, 
yet consciously disregarded it.” (internal citations omitted)). 
215  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“According to its 
terms, then, by forbidding ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ . . . the Clause disables the Leg-
islature from authorizing particular forms or ‘modes’ of punishment—specifically, cruel 
methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed.” (internal citations 
and emphasis omitted)). 
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A. A Blanket Ban in Lieu of an Individualized Inquiry 
Circuit courts of appeals have widely held that a prison violates the Eighth 
Amendment if it fails to conduct an individualized assessment of a person’s 
medical condition prior to prescribing a treatment plan. Courts are particularly 
wary where a prison has imposed a blanket ban on medical procedures. The 
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have addressed blanket bans on elective 
abortions,216 treatment for hepatitis C,217 and surgeries for cataracts.218 In each 
case, the court held the blanket ban to violate the Eighth Amendment. 
In Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, the 
Third Circuit heard a challenge to a jail policy requiring pregnant women to ob-
tain court-ordered releases and their own financing to have an abortion absent a 
medical emergency.219 Two individuals in the county’s custody sued for injunc-
tive relief after having been denied access to and funding for abortions.220 After 
losing in the district court, the county argued on appeal that it bore no financial 
responsibility for provision of non-medically necessary treatments, likening 
elective abortions to facelifts.221 The Third Circuit disagreed, instead holding 
pregnancy to be a serious medical need.222 The court held that the jail’s blanket 
ban on elective abortions “deni[ed] to a class of inmates the type of individual-
ized treatment normally associated with . . . adequate medical care” in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.223 
The Seventh Circuit reviewed a similar blanket ban in Roe v. Elyea.224 The 
Illinois Department of Corrections had implemented a policy where it would 
not begin treating an incarcerated person for hepatitis C if the person had less 
than eighteen months left to serve.225 Prison officials said the policy was neces-
sary to give the prison’s health care vendor time for six months of pre-
treatment, followed by a year-long treatment plan.226 The court held that cate-
gorically denying treatment for hepatitis C based on the expected length of an 
person’s incarceration instead of considering each individual person’s condition 
was “precisely the kind of conduct that constitutes a ‘substantial departure from 
accepted professional judgment’ ” and thus deliberate medical indifference.227 
 
216  Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987). 
217  Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2011). 
218  Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014). 
219  Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 328–29. 
220  Id. 
221  Id. at 344–45. 
222  Id. at 348. 
223  Id. at 347 (emphasis added). 
224  Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2011). 
225  Id. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. at 862–63 (citation omitted). 
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Most recently, the Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to the Nevada Depart-
ment of Corrections’ “one eye policy” in Colwell v. Bannister.228 While the pol-
icy provided for a case-by-case analysis of whether an individual with cataracts 
was able to “perform the required tasks of daily living in [prison],” prison med-
ical staff would deny cataract removal surgery where the individual had “one 
good eye.”229 The sixty-seven-year-old who challenged the policy had been 
blind in one eye due to cataracts for twelve years by the time the Ninth Circuit 
heard his appeal.230 The court held that blindness in one eye, unlike “a bump or 
scrape or tummy ache,” was a serious medical need for the purposes of the 
Farmer deliberate medical indifference analysis.231 It further held that the blan-
ket denial “of a medically indicated surgery solely on the basis of an adminis-
trative policy” was “the paradigm” of deliberate medical indifference.232  
Circuit courts have similarly required case-by-case analyses where 
transgender persons with gender dysphoria request SRS. Four years prior to 
Gibson, in Rosati v. Igbinoso, the Ninth Circuit heard allegations presented by 
Mia Rosati, an individual incarcerated in California, that prison officials had 
enacted a blanket policy against SRS.233 Prison officials had denied Rosati SRS 
despite her multiple attempts at self-castration under hormonal treatment.234 
The court held that Rosati’s allegations constituted a cognizable Eighth 
Amendment claim.235 And in Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit struck down, 
under the Eighth Amendment, a Wisconsin law that prohibited the use of state 
or federal funding for hormonal therapy or SRS for transgender persons behind 
bars.236 Finally, in De’lonta v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit held that a 
transgender individual serving a seventy-three-year sentence for bank robbery 
had “sufficiently alleged” the Virginia Department of Corrections’ deliberate 
indifference in denying her SRS.237 
In Edmo II, the Ninth Circuit noted that its holding “cleave[d] to settled 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence” requiring a fact-specific analysis of individ-
ual circumstances.238 The court cited the Kosilek IV decision as sister-circuit 
precedent for a fact-specific analysis.239 The First Circuit based its decision on 
the facts of Kosilek’s case, including conflicting expert testimony regarding the 
 
228  Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2014). 
229  Id. at 1064–65. 
230  Id. at 1063. 
231  Id. at 1066. 
232  Id. at 1063. 
233  Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2015). 
234  Id. at 1040. 
235  Id. at 1039–40. 
236  Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 552–53, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2011). 
237  De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522, 525 (4th Cir. 2013). After the court ordered the 
Virginia Department of Corrections to evaluate De’lonta for SRS, she was paroled within 
months. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 147. 
238  Edmo II, 935 F.3d 757, 794.  
239  Id. 
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medical necessity of SRS; a treatment plan for Kosilek, which was successful 
despite not including SRS; and credible security concerns presented by 
MDOC.240 The Ninth Circuit determined that the “factual differences” between 
Kosilek’s case and Edmo’s necessitated the different outcomes.241 IDOC had 
“not so much as allude[d]” to any security concerns, and the district court had 
found that there was no reasonable disagreement as to the necessity of SRS for 
Edmo.242 Despite resulting in opposite outcomes for the respective plaintiffs, 
the Ninth Circuit explained, the two cases nevertheless mirrored one another 
because each court had based its decision on individualized assessments.243 
Ironically, the Fifth Circuit also cited Kosilek IV, but used it as precedent 
for a circuit court “allow[ing] a blanket ban on [SRS].”244 The Fifth Circuit did 
this despite the Kosilek IV court expressly warning that its decision should not 
be interpreted as creating a de facto ban on SRS, as “any such policy would 
conflict with the requirement that medical care be individualized based on a 
particular prisoner’s serious medical needs.”245 In the face of decades of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence requiring individualized analyses for medical claims 
made by incarcerated persons—including for SRS—the Fifth Circuit held ex-
actly the opposite. 
B. “Universal Acceptance by the Medical Community” 
 The Gibson court decided not to diverge from other courts in holding that 
gender dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need—perhaps because the 
TDCJ did not dispute that fact.246 As to whether TDCJ officials acted with de-
liberate indifference, however, the court found no genuine dispute of material 
fact.247 The court made this determination because Gibson had failed to prove 
“universal acceptance by the medical community” that SRS can be required to 
treat gender dysphoria.248 A citation to any case law referencing this “universal 
acceptance” standard is conspicuously missing from the opinion. Rather, the 
court appears to have taken this standard from Gibson’s own brief.249 The dis-
sent hypothesized that Gibson’s brief simply quoted the universal acceptance 
standard as used by the district court.250 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit used this 
 
240  Id. 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  Id. 
244  Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). 
245  Kosilek IV, 774 F.3d 63, 90–91.  
246  Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219. 
247  Id. at 220. 
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
250  Id. at 235 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). The dissent also notes that the district court provid-
ed no case law to support this standard, and that Judge Barksdale was unable to locate any 
case law to support it. Id. 
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universal acceptance standard instead of the “knowledge and disregard of sub-
stantial risk” standard outlined by the Supreme Court in Farmer.251 Instead of 
reviewing whether the TDCJ knew of the risks associated with Gibson’s gender 
dysphoria and disregarded those risks by denying her SRS, the Gibson court 
simply held that Gibson’s claim was “doom[ed]” by her failure to prove univer-
sal medical consensus regarding SRS.252 
Even applying the universal medical acceptance standard, the Fifth Circuit 
overstated the degree to which the medical community disagrees regarding the 
use of SRS to treat gender dysphoria in some cases. As evidence of the medical 
community’s ongoing debate, the Gibson court relied on the expert testimony 
presented in Kosilek IV four years prior, noting simply that it “might have been 
better practice” if TDCJ had provided its own evidence.253 The Gibson court 
conceded that a single dissenting expert would not be enough to defeat univer-
sal medical consensus; rather, proof of a “robust and substantial good faith dis-
agreement dividing respected members of the expert medical community” 
would be needed.254 While that may describe the disagreement over the need 
for SRS in Kosilek’s case (four years prior), it does not appear to represent the 
discourse regarding SRS in the medical community as a whole. 
As evidence of precisely how much the conversation regarding SRS has 
changed over that time, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim of ongoing medical 
debate, citing to a laundry list of organizations and academics that have formed 
a consensus as to the medical necessity of SRS in certain circumstances.255 The 
list included organizations that have endorsed the WPATH Standards of Care, 
including the American Medical Association (“AMA”) and the American Psy-
chiatric Association.256 The AMA specifically supports the right of transgender 
persons behind bars to have access to SRS and filed an amicus brief, joined by 
other medical associations, in support of Edmo.257 Additionally, federal district 
courts have applied the WPATH Standards of Care to cases in a variety of con-
texts, including the denial of a passport,258 the denial of medical treatments un-
der insurance,259 and a “bathroom ban.”260 
 
251  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
252  Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221. 
253  Id. at 224. 
254  Id. at 220. 
255  Edmo II, 935 F.3d 757, 795.  
256  Id. 
257  Staff News Writer, Transgender Prisoners Have Fundamental Right to Appropriate 
Care, AMA (May 17, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/population-care/tran 
sgender-prisoners-have-fundamental-right-appropriate-care [perma.cc/H684-HPJF]. 
258  Zzyym v. Pompeo, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1248, 1258 (D. Colo. 2018) (“The Department defers 
to the medical ‘standards and recommendations for the [WPATH], recognized as the authori-
ty in this field by the American Medical Association’ . . . .”). 
259  Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 987 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (“Plaintiffs also point to 
the WPATH Standards of Care (“SOC”) for treatment of gender dysphoria, which are widely 
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When the Fifth Circuit may require a plaintiff to meet Gibson’s “universal 
acceptance” standard is unclear. In the deliberate medical indifference cases 
since Gibson, the court has not cited this standard but has rather continued to 
use the Farmer framework to analyze the individuals’ claims.261 Perhaps, Gib-
son’s universal acceptance standard is only required where the treatment the 
plaintiff seeks is new or emerging. 262 While such a precedent may delay better 
treatments for incarcerated individuals within the Circuit for longer, the deci-
sion can be justified by a desire to not expose the individuals to unproven 
treatments. Or, the court might only use differing standards when the plaintiff 
 
recognized guidelines for the management of transgender individuals with gender dyspho-
ria . . . .”). 
260  Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d 324, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“The 
WPATH Standards of Care are widely used and accepted in the field by clinicians dealing 
with youth with gender identity issues.”). Legislators in numerous jurisdictions have at-
tempted to pass some form of a bathroom bill—legislation aimed at restricting access to 
bathrooms or locker rooms based on sex assigned at birth. See Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom 
Bill” Legislative Tracking, NCSL (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-
bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/RSY5-EVL8]. North 
Carolina remains the only state to have successfully passed a bathroom bill (now repealed). 
Id. 
261  Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The prisoner ‘must first prove 
objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm’—in other words, the prisoner must 
prove a serious medical need. Second, the prisoner must prove the officials’ subjective 
knowledge of this substantial risk. Third, the prisoner must prove that the officials, despite 
their actual knowledge of the substantial risk, denied or delayed the prisoner’s medical 
treatment.” (footnotes omitted)); Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 217 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(“First, [the plaintiff] must show that the relevant official denied him ‘the minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities’ and exposed him ‘to a substantial risk of serious 
harm.’ . . . Second, the prisoner must show ‘that the official possessed a subjectively culpa-
ble state of mind in that he exhibited deliberate indifference’ to the risk of harm.” (internal 
citations omitted)); Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (“To establish a 
constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant: (1) was ‘aware of facts 
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’; (2) 
subjectively ‘dr[e]w the inference’ that the risk existed; and (3) disregarded the risk.” (cita-
tion omitted)); Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[The plaintiff] 
can show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that an official ‘refused to treat him, ig-
nored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct 
that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’ ” (citation omit-
ted)); Arenas v. Calhoun, 922 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 2019) (“To prevail on an Eighth 
Amendment claim, an inmate must establish two elements. First, he must demonstrate that 
the alleged deprivation was objectively serious, exposing him ‘to a substantial risk of serious 
harm’ and resulting ‘in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’ 
Second, an inmate must prove that the official possessed ‘a subjectively culpable state of 
mind’ in that he exhibited ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’ ” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
262  This still would not explain the Gibson court’s use of the standard. SRS can hardly be 
labelled new or emerging, considering its existence in America dating back to 1952. See 
Farah Naz Khan, A History of Transgender Health Care, SCI. AM.: GUEST BLOG (Nov. 16, 
2016), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/a-history-of-transgender-health-care/ 
[perma.cc/4ZCZ-3XGZ] (“The first American to undergo a sex change operation was Chris-
tine Jorgensen, who brought significant attention to the transgender revolution in America 
when her story hit New York Times headlines in 1952.”). 
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provides it with one, as Gibson did in acknowledging the need for “universal 
acceptance by the medical community” in her brief. It is doubtful that litigants 
provide courts with new legal standards very often. Although that very fact, if 
true, might be a way for both litigants and the court to distinguish Gibson away 
in the future. 
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
“Lest we lose the forest for the trees,” the Gibson court declared, “a prison 
violates the Eighth Amendment only if it inflicts punishment that is both ‘cruel 
and unusual.’ ”263 Thus, the court continued, a prison policy that is “widely 
practiced . . . across the country” cannot, “under the plain meaning of the 
word,” be “unusual.”264 Because only one state had ever provided SRS for an 
incarcerated person, Gibson could not state a claim for cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.265 As precedent for this holding, the Fifth Circuit cited to a book on 
the interpretation of legal texts by Justice Antonin Scalia,266 a Yale Law Journal 
article, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinions in Harmelin v. Michigan and Stanford 
v. Kentucky, and Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent in Glossip v. Gross.267 The 
court largely ignored, however, decades of case law where “cruel and unusual” 
is used as a term-of-art, rather than a conjunctive test, and decades more of case 
law analyzing deliberate medical indifference claims under the Farmer frame-
work.268 
As noted above, this idea has been the subject of much discussion.269 The 
Trop court questioned whether “the word ‘unusual’ ha[d] any qualitative mean-
ing different from ‘cruel’ ” when the two words are used together as a phrase.270 
Scholars are split on that issue. Some argue that the phrase should be interpret-
ed as a two-part conjunctive test, 271 while others suggest the phrase is simply 
an example of hendiadys.272 The degree of the framers’ intent has even been 
called into question, with one scholar suggesting that the phrase might have 
been little more than “constitutional ‘boilerplate.’ ”273 Justice Scalia was obvi-
 
263  Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 226 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). 
264  Id. 
265  Id. at 227–28. 
266  Id. at 226. Justice Scalia was not discussing the merits of this argument, rather providing 
an example of the way one ought to interpret a conjunctive list. See ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING THE LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 116 (2012). 
267  Gibson, 920 F.3d at 226–27. 
268  See supra Part II. 
269  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
270  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958). 
271  See Ryan, supra note 53, at 573–80. 
272  Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys in 
the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 706–20 (2016). “Hendiadys” refers to a phrase in 
which “two terms separated by a conjunction work together as a single complex expression.” 
Id. at 688. 
273  Granucci, supra note 53, at 839–40. 
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ously a proponent of the “plain meaning” analysis that the Gibson court adopt-
ed.274 And Justice Breyer adopted a similar line of reasoning in his recent dis-
sent to Glossip v. Gross.275 
Regardless of this debate, the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence has had little to do with the Constitution’s text and more to do with its 
interpretation of the clause’s intent.276 Or, as the Ninth Circuit aptly noted in 
Edmo II, this originalist argument does not control the plaintiffs’ claims—
Estelle v. Gamble does.277 The Gibson court concluding that Gibson’s claim 
failed “as a matter of established precedent” and then proceeding with its plain 
meaning analysis after the fact is telling.278 Indeed “as a matter of established 
precedent,” and as discussed above, Estelle, and then Farmer, established the 
framework for analyzing deliberate medical indifference.279 Circuit courts have 
applied Farmer’s “knowledge and disregard of substantial risk” test in review-
ing a variety of medical indifference claims brought by incarcerated persons.280 
If the plain meaning analysis the Gibson court used had been supported by case 
law and history, deliberate medical indifference jurisprudence would likely not 
have evolved in the way that it has. Unfortunately for Gibson, the Fifth Circuit 
circumvented Estelle and Farmer in using its “universal medical acceptance” 
test and its plain meaning analysis. Had the court been willing to apply Su-
preme Court precedent, as it has in other deliberate indifference cases,281 per-
haps Gibson would have been granted relief. 
The need to analyze whether a “punishment” is both cruel and unusual 
rarely arrives. This is the first case in which the Fifth Circuit decided to estab-
lish that analysis, and how often the question will resurface is unclear. For 
claims of deliberate medical indifference, there will likely be some sort of trend 
for prisons to either provide or to deny a specific medical treatment. Gibson 
 
274  See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“by for-
bidding ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Clause disables the Legislature from authoriz-
ing . . . cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed.” (inter-
nal citations omitted)); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989), abrogated by Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Justice Scalia authored both opinions. 
275  Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 938–39 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Eighth 
Amendment forbids punishments that are cruel and unusual. Last year, in 2014, only seven 
States carried out an execution. Perhaps more importantly, in the last two decades, the impo-
sition and implementation of the death penalty have increasingly become unusual.”). 
276  Bray, supra note 272, at 708 (“It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court has not structured its 
recent decisions on the Clause in terms of two requirements. But those decisions have only a 
tenuous connection to the constitutional text; they rest primarily on other modalities of con-
stitutional interpretation.” (footnotes omitted)); see also David A. Strauss, The Modernizing 
Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 864 (2009) (“Probably the most overt 
adoption of the modernization approach has occurred in cases interpreting the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
277  Edmo II, 935 F.3d 757, 797 n.21. 
278  Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 226 (5th Cir. 2019). 
279  See discussion supra Part II. 
280  See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
281  See supra note 214. 
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certainly calls into question new medical procedures. As discussed above, a 
new or emerging medical procedure will be per se unusual until a certain per-
centage of prisons provide it for incarcerated persons.282 In these cases, perhaps 
the Fifth Circuit is not concerned with depriving, however briefly, the incarcer-
ated persons housed in its jurisdiction with the latest medical treatments. More 
likely, perhaps, the court will simply leave out this plain meaning analysis from 
its deliberate medical indifference cases moving forward, as it has in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Fifth Circuit’s Gibson v. Collier decision was indeed unusual. And the 
decision was also cruel, in the fact that it denied a person suffering from gender 
dysphoria the treatment that may have provided her with relief from her pain. 
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit largely ignored established precedent 
relating to deliberate medical indifference. The court eschewed sister circuit 
decisions directly on point with Gibson’s claim in favor of an approach that has 
already been ignored in subsequent Fifth Circuit cases and that will likely be 
found to be unworkable moving forward. 
 The Supreme Court denied Gibson’s petition for writ of certiorari.283 Her 
opportunity for relief has likely passed. And the Gibson decision may foreclose 
the claims of other individuals seeking relief in a variety of contexts moving 
forward. The Fifth Circuit has now established precedent for permitting prisons 
to impose blanket bans on medical procedures, for ignoring the Farmer frame-
work for analyzing deliberate medical indifference claims, and for finding pun-
ishments to be constitutional no matter how cruel—provided they are not also 
unusual. To the extent the Fifth Circuit is willing to distinguish away Gibson, 
this unusual decision’s harm may be limited to Gibson’s own case. For incar-
cerated persons—particularly those who suffer with gender dysphoria—within 
its jurisdiction, however, there are now fewer reasons to hope that the Fifth 
Circuit will serve justice when prisons fail to provide adequate medical treat-
ment. 
 
282  See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
283  Gibson v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019) (mem). 
